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Elections, Violence
and Democracy
in Iraq

25 Years of publishing the bridgewater Review Michael Kryzanek

audience. I am sure you will enjoy
Bill’s take on his travels in France
and his view of the French and
French culture.

Shaheen Mozaffar

In the last few years Patti Fanning,
also of the Sociology Department,
has come on board as Associate
Editor. Patti, brings not only her
writing and editing skills to the
Review, but also her passion for
local history, Irish studies and
biography of Massachusetts
luminaries. Her contributions
to the magazine have been read
with great interest by our readers.
In this issue Patti writes on the
Missionary Sisters of Louisburg
Square, who were one of the first
religious orders to minister to the
African-Americans of Boston.
Patti is an Associate Editor who I
hope will remain with the Review
for many years to come.
Finally, Charles Angell, the magazine’s book review editor, has
been with the Review from almost
the beginning. Charlie has one of
the toughest jobs on the magazine—to comment on and critique the books that we
feel our readers need to know about. During his time as
book review editor, Charlie has reviewed a wide range of
books from Philip Roth’s The Plot Against America to the
self-help manual Who Moved My Cheese to in this issue,
American Vertigo, Bernard Levy’s acclaimed retracing of
Alexis de Tocqueville’s travels through America. Charlie
is one of the most thoughtful and erudite members of
the faculty that I have had the pleasure of working with
over the years.
As a senior member of the faculty I have been asked
on many occasions by prospective students and concerned parents to tell them why they should choose
Bridgewater State College. Of course the cost is quite
attractive and the location close to home is a bonus as
well. But I dwell on the faculty and give them a copy
of the Bridgewater Review. I tell them that if their son
or daughter wants to go to a college where faculty

In 2005, Iraq held three successful national elections
that were largely free and credible by accepted international standards. On January 30, 58% of registered voters went to the polls to elect the Transitional National
Assembly (TNA), which wrote the new Constitution.
On October 15, 63% of registered voters turned out
for the constitutional referendum to approve the new
Constitution by an overwhelming margin of 79% to
21%. And on December 15, 76% of registered voters
cast ballots to elect the 275-seat Council of Representatives (COR), Iraq’s national legislature.

members place their primary emphasis on teaching and
working with students, yet are so dedicated to their academic disciplines that they are also scholars of the first
degree, then there is no better place than Bridgewater.
If the Bridgewater Review has done anything over the
last 25 years, I hope that it has been helpful in alerting
the general public to the very special faculty who teach
here. Happy Birthday Bridgewater Review, and to my fellow faculty colleagues, thanks for being so special.

Michael Kryzanek
Editor

through one of Iraq’s holiest Shiite mosques in Samarra
on February 22, 2006, unleashing a paroxysm of retaliatory sectarian attacks and pushing the country to the
brink of an all-out civil war.
Iraq thus confronts a central challenge today: will its
political future be determined by the three resoundingly
successful elections held in 2005, or by the brutality and
violence of terrorism, insurgency and sectarian conflict?
This article answers this question through a systematic
analysis and pragmatic assessment of the relationship
between elections and violence and its impact on the
prospects for democracy in Iraq.

Holding three elections in one year is a daunting task
even for established democracies, but it is an extraordinary feat for a country that is trying to establish a new
democracy after three decades of tyranny while being
wracked by terrorist bombings and violent insurgency.
The overall incidence and intensity of terrorist and insurgent attacks declined progressively on each Election
Day, but the terrorists and insurgents posed an everpresent threat, intimidating, kidnapping and occasionally killing political candidates, voters, poll workers and
election officials in the lead up to all three elections.
The elections were important components of a larger
political process designed to establish the institutional and political foundations for democracy in Iraq
in the aftermath of the American-led invasion that
overthrew Saddam Hussein in March 2003. The COR
elections represented the final step in the formation of
a democratic government. But as Iraqi leaders wrangled
unsuccessfully over the choice of a new Prime Minister
and the composition of the new government two
months after the COR elections, a terrorist bomb ripped

The Three Elections
Given the precarious security conditions caused by
militant insurgency and terrorist bombings, the three
Iraqi elections in 2005 were a resounding success. One
factor contributing to
this success was a rare
manifestation of sound
political judgment by
the US when it relented
on its initial refusal to
allow a substantial role
for the UN in Iraq and
agreed to an exclusive
UN role in assisting
the newly-established
Independent Election
Commission of Iraq
(IECI) in the organization and management of the three elections. This
change in US policy, however, was due largely to the
steadfast opposition of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani,
Iraq’s most revered Shiite religious leader and an astute
political strategist, to any US involvement in the elections because it would diminish the legitimacy of the
elections in the eyes of the Iraqis and the international
community, and to his uncompromising insistence on
an exclusive UN role in overseeing the elections.

.In addition, approximately 300,000 Iraqi citizens living in 18
countries across the world voted in January and December, but
not in October due to logistical constraints. Also, approximately
200,000 eligible voters incarcerated in prisons and detention centers (under both Iraqi and US control, including the
infamous Abu Ghraib prison), residing as patients in hospitals,
and serving in the Iraqi police force and the military voted in
special one-day elections held prior to the regularly scheduled
elections in October and December. It is not known whether
Saddam Hussein, who was being held in a US detention center
and was an eligible voter, chose to exercise his franchise. For
reasons of space, this article does not deal with these elections.

The IECI, whose seven members and the Chief Electoral
Officer were selected by the United Nations (UN),
received the full range of organizational, technical
and logistical assistance that is now commonplace in
democracy promotion strategies from an International
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Elections Assistance Team operating under the United
Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq and funded from a
general UN fund facility with contributions from 25
countries, including the United States. This assistance
enabled the IECI to organize the three elections professionally and execute them competently according to
accepted international standards.
Amidst escalating terrorist and insurgent attacks, the
IECI conducted a successful voter registration exercise
in November 2004, registering 14.3 million voters,
which represented a substantial percentage of eligible
voters in an estimated population of 28 million people,
almost half of whom are minors. It conducted another
registration exercise in August 2005 to update the voter
list, increasing the number of registered voters since
January to 15.5 million. In response to the poor security
situation in the dangerous western governorate of
Anbar (the heart of Sunni insurgency and the scene of
high US casualties), the IECI extended this registration
period by one week, resulting in an 18% increase since
January in the registration of Sunni voters.

In one poll, for instance, 91% of respondents favored
democracy over authoritarian rule, and 85% favored
democracy despite its manifest limitations. These
figures also testify to the success of IECI’s new nationwide security provisions and its special provisions in
Anbar to help increase Sunni participation in October
and December. These provisions included: a three-ring
security perimeter around polling stations manned by
all-Iraqi security forces, backed with unobtrusive US
military support, for three days before and after Election
Day; coordination with local leaders, and even with
some Sunni insurgents (via mediation by Sunni politicians) for additional security on Election Day; increased
recruitment of Sunni poll workers; and IECI rulings
that permitted voters classified as “internally displaced
persons” (due to political violence) to vote in designated
polling stations, and voters who could not reach their
assigned polling stations due to security threats to vote
in the nearest safe polling stations.

Finally, the high figures testify to the refusal by the
majority of ordinary Sunnis to repeat their strategic
mistake in heeding their leaders’ misguided call to
These high registration figures translated into increasboycott the January TNA elections, which excluded the
ingly higher voter turnout from 58% to 63% to 76%
Sunnis from the constitution-writing process. Sunni
through the three elections (Table 1). Voter turnout
voters thus turned out in huge numbers in October to
increased even more sharply in the Sunni majority
reject the new Constitution with a 97% “No” vote in
governorates of Anbar and Salahaddin (where Saddam
Anbar and an 82% “No” vote in Salahaddin. In Diyala,
Hussein’s hometown of Tikrit is located), in Diyala and
the Constitution barely passed with a 51% “Yes” vote.
Ninewa, both with heavily mixed populations but with
In Ninewa, only the combined high turnout among the
a Sunni majority, and in Baghdad with a heavily mixed
Kurds, Shiites, Christians, Turkomans and other Arab
population but with a Shiite majority. Anbar witminority groups helped to offset the high Sunni turnout
nessed a dramatic increase from 2% in January to 38%
and produce a 55% “No” vote against the Constitution,
in October and 86% in December, with corresponding
well-short of the two-thirds “No” vote in three goverfigures of 29%, 90%, and 98% for Salahaddin, 33%, 67%,
norates required for the rejection of the Constitution
and 75% for Diyala, 17%, 54%, and 70% for Ninewa,
and a new referendum. Sunni voters turned out in
and 51%, 55% and 70% in Baghdad.
even higher numbers in December to elect three Sunni
Table 1
parties—the Iraqi Accordance Front, the Iraqi Front for
Voter turnout percentages in three Iraqi elections in 2005
National Dialogue, and the Iraqi Nation List—to the
Governorates
January	October	December
COR with a combined total of 56 seats, compared to
Anbar		 2.42		 38.35		 86.37
none in the TNA (Table 2).
Babil		 73.06		 72.74		 79.43
Table 2
Baghdad		 51.49		 54.97		 70.06
Results of the COR Elections in Iraq, December 15, 2005
Basrah		 72.36		 63.01		 74.20
Political Parties	Seat Totals	Seat %
Diyala		 33.09		 67.41		 74.87
Dohuk		 92.46		 84.81		 92.00
Unified Iraqi Alliance		
128		46.55		
Kurdistani Gathering		
53		19.27
Erbil		 83.79		 95.46		 95.26
44		16.00
Karbala		 74.75		 60.19		 70.44		 Iraqi Accordance Front		
Misan		 61.25		 57.59		 73.27
National Iraqi List		
25		 9.09
Iraqi Front for National Dialogue
11		 4.00
Muthanna		 64.79		 58.80		 66.07
Islamic Union of Kurdistan		
5		 1.82
Najaf		 75.25		 56.51		 72.76
Ninewa		 16.96		 53.50		 70.16
Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering 3		 1.09
Progressives		
2		 .73
Qadissiya		 70.73		 56.71		 64.67
Iraqi National List		
1		 .36
Salahaddin		 29.25		 90.36		 98.43
Suleimaniya		 82.11		 75.25		 84.19
Iraqi Turkoman Front		
1		 .36
Al Ezediah Movement 		
1		 .36
Taamim		 70.01		 78.47		 86.10
for Progressing and Reform
Theqar		 68.84		 56.62		 71.85
Al Rafedeen List		
1		 .36
Wasit		 71.08		 53.72		 67.99
IRAQ		58.32		 63.28		 76.36
These high registration and turnout figures testify
to the strong and widespread support for democracy
expressed by all Iraqis in several public opinion polls.

Totals		

275

100.00

. Mark Tessler, Mansoor Moaddel, and Ronald Inglehart,
“What do Iraqis Want?” Journal of Democracy 17:1
(January 2006), pp. 38-50

The results in Table 2 approximate the broad sectarian and ethnic divisions in Iraq, but these results also
obscure politically salient intra-sectarian and intra-ethnic, as well as ideological, differences within the major
parties in the COR, all of which are actually coalitions
of groups representing these differences. The Kurdistani Gathering, for instance, consists of two traditionally antagonistic Kurdish parties – the Patriotic Union
of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party—and
includes a moderate religious party. But the Kurds are
also represented by the fundamentalist Islamic Union
of Kurdistan, with 5 COR seats. The three Sunni
parties include nationalists, Islamists and secularists.
The Iraqi Accordance Front with a broader support
base includes the Iraqi Islamic Party, the Iraqi Front for
National Dialogue includes a small Christian Party and
two small Turkoman parties, and the Iraqi National
List supports crackdown of Baathists and Sunni Islamic
insurgents. The Iraqi National List headed by former
Prime Minister Iyad Allawi is a secular nationalist coalition of Sunnis and Shiites. It is the only party to win
votes in every governorate, indicating the existence of
a nationwide secular base that could be mobilized to
counter the growing influence of Islamists.
The most important of these intra-group differences,
however, exists within the United Iraq Alliance (UIA),
the Islamist-leaning Shiite political bloc that controls
128 COR seats. The UIA, which consists of 16 mostly
small parties, is spearheaded by three major parties
which together control 82 seats, but which also have
deep political differences. The Supreme Council for
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) with 25 seats is heavily Islamist and is widely viewed to posses close political
ties with Iran, where it was founded by Iraqi Shiite
exiles in 1982. The al-Dawah Party (DP) with 25 seats
includes a secular and a religious faction, and is headed
by former interim Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafri. The
al-Sadrites with 32 seats is headed by the populist and
fiercely anti-American cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr.
Moqtada al-Sadr’s populism threatens the political
leadership of the Shiite religious establishment in Najaf
and of its spiritual head, Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani. His
militia, the Mahdi Army, which has often clashed with
SCIRI’s militia, the Badr Brigade, is now in virtually
total control of Sadr City, the slum neighborhood of
Baghdad from where Moqtada draws his political
support. His supporters ran as independents in the

January elections, but because he has a large following
among the Shiite poor classes, he was reluctantly invited to join UIA for the December elections to ensure a
Shiite legislative majority after the Sunnis agreed to participate in the COR elections. As the largest party in the
COR, the UIA has the constitutional authority to nominate a candidate for Prime Minister for final approval by
the COR. In the ensuing fight for the nomination, the
al-Sadrites’ control of 32 COR seats was indispensable
in al-Jaafri’s unexpected victory by one vote over Adel
Abdel-Mahdi of SCIRI, who was supported by other
UIA, as well as by Kurdish and Sunni, parties.
However, a coalition of Kurdish, Sunni and secular
nationalist parties fiercely opposed al-Jaafri’s candidacy, because of his inept leadership as interim Prime
Minister, and especially his inability to control the
escalating violence in the wake of the Samarra mosque
bombing and rein in the Ministry of Interior “death
squads” who are widely known to engage in the
systematic killing of Sunnis. As the political impasse
continued with al-Jaafri’s adamant refusal to relinquish
his candidacy, and as political violence pushed Iraq to
the brink of civil war, opposition to his candidacy began
to emerge even within the UIA. Under intense pressure
from the United States, and nudged by the threat of an
alternative Kurdish-Sunni-secular nationalist majority coalition forming and nominating and approving
its own candidate for Prime Minister, the UIA political
leadership led by Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani forced alJaafri on 20 April 2006 to relinquish his position, opening the way for the formation of a unity government.
The Politics and Patterns of Violence
The formation of a unity government will not immediately stop the violence gripping Iraq, but it is
an essential first step in creating a favorable political
environment for weakening, and eventually removing,
the incentives for the use of violence, especially by the
Sunni-led insurgency. Violence in Iraq, in other words, is
neither sectarian nor ethnic based. It is politically driven,
and thus requires a political solution.

The data in Figure 1 indicate the political underpinnings
of the violence, and especially the Sunni basis of the
insurgency. Of the 8799 reported insurgents and terrorist attacks between April 2004 and December 2005,
47% were concentrated in the two Sunni governorates
of Anbar and Salahddin, while 48% were concentrated
in the heavily mixed governorates of Baghdad, Diyala,
Ninewa and Tameem with large Sunni concentrations.
. Sadr City is named after Moqtada’s father, who was a
By contrast, only 5% of the attacks occurred in the nine
grand ayatollah, and, along with his brothers, was killed by
Shiite majority governorates, and a negligible .06% in
agents of Saddam Hussein. Moqtada aspires to inherit his
father’s leadership mantle but cannot do so because he has never the three Kurdish governorates.
completed the rigorous religious education and training Shiite
Also indicative of the political basis of violence are the
tradition requires before a person acquires the title of ayatollah. variations in its incidence and intensity, as well as the
differences in the groups and their motivations for
engaging in it. For instance, the sharp increase in the
Bridgewater Review
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Elections Assistance Team operating under the United
Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq and funded from a
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countries, including the United States. This assistance
enabled the IECI to organize the three elections professionally and execute them competently according to
accepted international standards.
Amidst escalating terrorist and insurgent attacks, the
IECI conducted a successful voter registration exercise
in November 2004, registering 14.3 million voters,
which represented a substantial percentage of eligible
voters in an estimated population of 28 million people,
almost half of whom are minors. It conducted another
registration exercise in August 2005 to update the voter
list, increasing the number of registered voters since
January to 15.5 million. In response to the poor security
situation in the dangerous western governorate of
Anbar (the heart of Sunni insurgency and the scene of
high US casualties), the IECI extended this registration
period by one week, resulting in an 18% increase since
January in the registration of Sunni voters.

In one poll, for instance, 91% of respondents favored
democracy over authoritarian rule, and 85% favored
democracy despite its manifest limitations. These
figures also testify to the success of IECI’s new nationwide security provisions and its special provisions in
Anbar to help increase Sunni participation in October
and December. These provisions included: a three-ring
security perimeter around polling stations manned by
all-Iraqi security forces, backed with unobtrusive US
military support, for three days before and after Election
Day; coordination with local leaders, and even with
some Sunni insurgents (via mediation by Sunni politicians) for additional security on Election Day; increased
recruitment of Sunni poll workers; and IECI rulings
that permitted voters classified as “internally displaced
persons” (due to political violence) to vote in designated
polling stations, and voters who could not reach their
assigned polling stations due to security threats to vote
in the nearest safe polling stations.

Finally, the high figures testify to the refusal by the
majority of ordinary Sunnis to repeat their strategic
mistake in heeding their leaders’ misguided call to
These high registration figures translated into increasboycott the January TNA elections, which excluded the
ingly higher voter turnout from 58% to 63% to 76%
Sunnis from the constitution-writing process. Sunni
through the three elections (Table 1). Voter turnout
voters thus turned out in huge numbers in October to
increased even more sharply in the Sunni majority
reject the new Constitution with a 97% “No” vote in
governorates of Anbar and Salahaddin (where Saddam
Anbar and an 82% “No” vote in Salahaddin. In Diyala,
Hussein’s hometown of Tikrit is located), in Diyala and
the Constitution barely passed with a 51% “Yes” vote.
Ninewa, both with heavily mixed populations but with
In Ninewa, only the combined high turnout among the
a Sunni majority, and in Baghdad with a heavily mixed
Kurds, Shiites, Christians, Turkomans and other Arab
population but with a Shiite majority. Anbar witminority groups helped to offset the high Sunni turnout
nessed a dramatic increase from 2% in January to 38%
and produce a 55% “No” vote against the Constitution,
in October and 86% in December, with corresponding
well-short of the two-thirds “No” vote in three goverfigures of 29%, 90%, and 98% for Salahaddin, 33%, 67%,
norates required for the rejection of the Constitution
and 75% for Diyala, 17%, 54%, and 70% for Ninewa,
and a new referendum. Sunni voters turned out in
and 51%, 55% and 70% in Baghdad.
even higher numbers in December to elect three Sunni
Table 1
parties—the Iraqi Accordance Front, the Iraqi Front for
Voter turnout percentages in three Iraqi elections in 2005
National Dialogue, and the Iraqi Nation List—to the
Governorates
January	October	December
COR with a combined total of 56 seats, compared to
Anbar		 2.42		 38.35		 86.37
none in the TNA (Table 2).
Babil		 73.06		 72.74		 79.43
Table 2
Baghdad		 51.49		 54.97		 70.06
Results of the COR Elections in Iraq, December 15, 2005
Basrah		 72.36		 63.01		 74.20
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Diyala		 33.09		 67.41		 74.87
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5		 1.82
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Qadissiya		 70.73		 56.71		 64.67
Iraqi National List		
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Salahaddin		 29.25		 90.36		 98.43
Suleimaniya		 82.11		 75.25		 84.19
Iraqi Turkoman Front		
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Al Ezediah Movement 		
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for Progressing and Reform
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expressed by all Iraqis in several public opinion polls.
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. Mark Tessler, Mansoor Moaddel, and Ronald Inglehart,
“What do Iraqis Want?” Journal of Democracy 17:1
(January 2006), pp. 38-50

The results in Table 2 approximate the broad sectarian and ethnic divisions in Iraq, but these results also
obscure politically salient intra-sectarian and intra-ethnic, as well as ideological, differences within the major
parties in the COR, all of which are actually coalitions
of groups representing these differences. The Kurdistani Gathering, for instance, consists of two traditionally antagonistic Kurdish parties – the Patriotic Union
of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party—and
includes a moderate religious party. But the Kurds are
also represented by the fundamentalist Islamic Union
of Kurdistan, with 5 COR seats. The three Sunni
parties include nationalists, Islamists and secularists.
The Iraqi Accordance Front with a broader support
base includes the Iraqi Islamic Party, the Iraqi Front for
National Dialogue includes a small Christian Party and
two small Turkoman parties, and the Iraqi National
List supports crackdown of Baathists and Sunni Islamic
insurgents. The Iraqi National List headed by former
Prime Minister Iyad Allawi is a secular nationalist coalition of Sunnis and Shiites. It is the only party to win
votes in every governorate, indicating the existence of
a nationwide secular base that could be mobilized to
counter the growing influence of Islamists.
The most important of these intra-group differences,
however, exists within the United Iraq Alliance (UIA),
the Islamist-leaning Shiite political bloc that controls
128 COR seats. The UIA, which consists of 16 mostly
small parties, is spearheaded by three major parties
which together control 82 seats, but which also have
deep political differences. The Supreme Council for
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) with 25 seats is heavily Islamist and is widely viewed to posses close political
ties with Iran, where it was founded by Iraqi Shiite
exiles in 1982. The al-Dawah Party (DP) with 25 seats
includes a secular and a religious faction, and is headed
by former interim Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafri. The
al-Sadrites with 32 seats is headed by the populist and
fiercely anti-American cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr.
Moqtada al-Sadr’s populism threatens the political
leadership of the Shiite religious establishment in Najaf
and of its spiritual head, Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani. His
militia, the Mahdi Army, which has often clashed with
SCIRI’s militia, the Badr Brigade, is now in virtually
total control of Sadr City, the slum neighborhood of
Baghdad from where Moqtada draws his political
support. His supporters ran as independents in the

January elections, but because he has a large following
among the Shiite poor classes, he was reluctantly invited to join UIA for the December elections to ensure a
Shiite legislative majority after the Sunnis agreed to participate in the COR elections. As the largest party in the
COR, the UIA has the constitutional authority to nominate a candidate for Prime Minister for final approval by
the COR. In the ensuing fight for the nomination, the
al-Sadrites’ control of 32 COR seats was indispensable
in al-Jaafri’s unexpected victory by one vote over Adel
Abdel-Mahdi of SCIRI, who was supported by other
UIA, as well as by Kurdish and Sunni, parties.
However, a coalition of Kurdish, Sunni and secular
nationalist parties fiercely opposed al-Jaafri’s candidacy, because of his inept leadership as interim Prime
Minister, and especially his inability to control the
escalating violence in the wake of the Samarra mosque
bombing and rein in the Ministry of Interior “death
squads” who are widely known to engage in the
systematic killing of Sunnis. As the political impasse
continued with al-Jaafri’s adamant refusal to relinquish
his candidacy, and as political violence pushed Iraq to
the brink of civil war, opposition to his candidacy began
to emerge even within the UIA. Under intense pressure
from the United States, and nudged by the threat of an
alternative Kurdish-Sunni-secular nationalist majority coalition forming and nominating and approving
its own candidate for Prime Minister, the UIA political
leadership led by Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani forced alJaafri on 20 April 2006 to relinquish his position, opening the way for the formation of a unity government.
The Politics and Patterns of Violence
The formation of a unity government will not immediately stop the violence gripping Iraq, but it is
an essential first step in creating a favorable political
environment for weakening, and eventually removing,
the incentives for the use of violence, especially by the
Sunni-led insurgency. Violence in Iraq, in other words, is
neither sectarian nor ethnic based. It is politically driven,
and thus requires a political solution.

The data in Figure 1 indicate the political underpinnings
of the violence, and especially the Sunni basis of the
insurgency. Of the 8799 reported insurgents and terrorist attacks between April 2004 and December 2005,
47% were concentrated in the two Sunni governorates
of Anbar and Salahddin, while 48% were concentrated
in the heavily mixed governorates of Baghdad, Diyala,
Ninewa and Tameem with large Sunni concentrations.
. Sadr City is named after Moqtada’s father, who was a
By contrast, only 5% of the attacks occurred in the nine
grand ayatollah, and, along with his brothers, was killed by
Shiite majority governorates, and a negligible .06% in
agents of Saddam Hussein. Moqtada aspires to inherit his
father’s leadership mantle but cannot do so because he has never the three Kurdish governorates.
completed the rigorous religious education and training Shiite
Also indicative of the political basis of violence are the
tradition requires before a person acquires the title of ayatollah. variations in its incidence and intensity, as well as the
differences in the groups and their motivations for
engaging in it. For instance, the sharp increase in the
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Figure 1
Patterns of Political Violence in Iraq:
April 2004–December 2005
Number of attacks
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Source: Calculated by author from various sources

number and intensity of violence at the end of 2004
that peaked with the TNA elections in January 2005
was driven by a loose alliance of diehard Baathists,
Sunni Islamic extremists, and Al-Qaeda in
Mesopotamia (AQM). The AQM is offshoot of Osama
Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda network formed in Iraq by the
Jordanian insurgent Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in the political chaos that followed the US occupation. Implacably
opposed to the US occupation and the emerging Shiite
political power, these groups sought nothing less than
the total removal of all foreign troops from Iraq and
to halt the unfolding process of democratic transition.
An undetermined number of fragmented groups of
nationalist-secularist Sunnis, who accepted the demise
of the Saddam regime but not the loss of Sunni political
power, initially joined these extremist groups and, with
the tacit support of the Sunni population who had been
encouraged to boycott the TNA elections, engaged in
political violence that was at the time directed principally at US and coalition forces.
However, the success of the TNA elections and the
exclusion of the Sunnis from the constitution writing
forced these moderate Sunni groups to reconsider their
position and adopt a political strategy aimed at negotiating concessions on the new constitution in return for
embracing the new democratic dispensation, combined
with an armed strategy aimed at using low-intensity
violence to bolster their negotiating position. This new
strategy put the Sunni insurgents at odds with the diehard Baathists and led to armed clashes between them
and the AQM, not the least because AQM was dominated by foreign jihadists (including Zarqawi) and because
it relied heavily on suicide bombings that were killing
growing numbers of Iraqis. But, coupled with the new
IECI security measures, the new strategy also helped to
reduce the level of violence and dramatically increase
Sunni participation in the October constitutional

referendum and the December COR elections. The
Sunni embrace of democratic transition enhanced the
prospects of its success, forcing the diehard Baathists
and the AQM to shift to sectarian violence in which
Iraqi religious and political leaders and the new Iraqi
police and military forces replaced the US and coalition
forces as the principal targets.
The resounding success of the December elections
in improving Sunni representation in the COR and
participation in the new government precipitated the
Samarra mosque bombing, most probably by AQM, as
a last-ditch effort by extremists in the hope of unleashing retaliatory sectarian attacks that would destabilize
the country and derail the democratic transition. That
such attacks occurred with increasing frequency and
frightening intensity in the immediate aftermath of the
bombing before subsiding testifies less to the success
of the extremists’ tactics than to the disturbingly large
numbers of Sunni and Shiite militias that have emerged
in Iraq to fill the security vacuum created by inadequate US forces and the inexperience of the new Iraqi
military and security forces. That these militias could
themselves become the instruments of a prolonged
Lebanon-style civil war cannot be discounted. To defuse
this potentially explosive situation, the quick formation
of government of national unity becomes all the more
imperative.
Conclusion
On April 23, 2005, after weeks of hard and contentious
bargaining that led to the replacement of Ibrahim Jaafri
with his deputy Nouri al-Maliki as the candidate for
Prime Minister, the COR, meeting only for the second
time since the December elections, authorized the new
candidate to form a cabinet within the stipulated 30
days and approved five key appointments that pave
the way for the formation of a national unity government. The COR reappointed the current President
Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, and also appointed a Sunni and a
Shitte as the two Vice-Presidents. It also elected a Sunni
as the Speaker of the COR, and a Shiite and a Kurd as
the two Deputy-Speakers.
These, however, are only the first steps. Jockeying for
positions in the new cabinet will produce a new round
of intense and possibly acrimonious bargaining. After
the installation of the new cabinet, the new government will have to confront, among the host of problems
facing Iraq, the twin and related challenges of security
and economic reconstruction. Insecurity remains the
single most important threat to Iraq’s political stability.
Confronting it will require convincing the remaining
diehard Baathists that it is in their and the country’s interest to accept the new reality. It will require defeating
the AQM by killing the foreign jihadists who dominate
it, simply because they will not give up without a
fight. But most critically, it will require controlling and
disbanding all the Sunni and Shiite militias that now
provide much-needed security in a dangerously insecure

environment, for, if left unchecked, they could easily
transform themselves into permanent protection rackets, as, for example, in Afghanistan.

Iraq. The important US strategic interests in the Middle
East include: coping with Iran’s nuclear ambition and
the threat it poses to Israel, Saudi Arabia and the region;
combating al-Qaeda and its terrorist networks (a goal
totally unrelated to the invasion of Iraq); keeping the
Persian Gulf oil supply line open (not to feed US appetite for oil, since our consumption of Middle East
oil is negligible, but to keep the European and Japanese
economies that depend on it strong, and to maintain
a stable world oil market); and promoting democracy
as an indispensable tool in the fight against terrorism.
The US invasion (even though ill-timed and strategically misguided in implementation, but correct in its
central objective of removing Saddam Hussein) and
the occupation of Iraq (despite the many mistakes in
its implementation) are inextricably intertwined with
these interests.

Security is also essential for the much-need economic
reconstruction and development. Despite the investment of vast amounts of US funds, a variety of strategic
and tactical mistakes that have become the hallmark of
US policy in Iraq has contributed to the failure of the
Iraqi economy to return even to its anemic pre-war levels. Initial assessments based on flawed assumptions
and intelligence viewed Iraq’s enormous oil resource as a
crucial source for financing the postwar reconstruction.
But in response to the international embargo imposed
on Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War, Saddam Hussein cut
back on the investments required to maintain and
modernize the oil production facilities. Increased postwar oil production has thus been stymied by decaying
infrastructure.

Withdrawing US troops from Iraq in the near future
is thus supremely irresponsible. President Bush has
responsibly decided that US troops will not be withdrawn, but has irresponsibly failed, again, to justify that
decision in terms of the important US national interests
at stake in Iraq and the Middle East. Whether the next
administration will act more responsibly will depend on
whether the American public will demand such responsibility. That, however, is very unlikely.

Compounding the problem has been the terrorist and
insurgent attacks on the oil facilities, as well as on many
postwar reconstruction projects, killing both foreign
contractors and Iraqi workers. The diversion of increasingly larger amount of US reconstruction funds to the
provision of security for these construction sites and
oil refineries has, as a result, depleted the amount available for modernizing the oil facilities and financing the
reconstruction projects.

—Shaheen Mozaffar is Professor of Political Science.

The new Iraqi government, even one pragmatically
negotiated on the basis of national unity and powersharing, is unlikely to deal successfully on its own with
these twin challenges, or, for that matter, with any of
the other problems facing the shattered country. US
presence in Iraq is thus essential. In the violent aftermath
of the Samarra mosque bombing, both Shiites and the
Sunnis have increasingly, and ironically, come to see the
US presence as having a moderating effect on sectarian
violence. Moreover, having invaded the country, we
have an obligation to help Iraqis out of the political insecurity and economic disarray our policies and actions
have caused.
National self interest, not altruism, dictates this obligation. To fulfill it, however, requires us to refocus our
misguided concern with bringing the troops home to
the more important concern with our strategic national
interests in the Middle East as the overriding goal of our
Iraq policy. The Bush administration has been inexcusably derelict in articulating that national interest and its
relationship to its Iraq policy. But that does not mean
that there are no strategic US national interests in the
Middle East, or that they are unrelated to our actions in
. For the latest and the best assessment of the failure of US
postwar reconstruction policy in Iraq, see David L. Phillips,
Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco
(Boulder, CO: Westview, 2005)
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Figure 1
Patterns of Political Violence in Iraq:
April 2004–December 2005
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